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1. Introduction 
Information systems development (ISD) projects are complex by nature. Work processes are non-routine and 
intangible, work outcomes are difficult to measure, and requirements may continuously be revised due to changing 
business processes and unforeseen technical obstacles [40]. Managers use project control to cope with these issues, 
which is typically defined as an attempt to ensure that the behavior of project participants is aligned with organizational 
objectives [27]. Despite these steps, ISD projects often fail: the Standish Group’s study found that only 29% of such 
projects are considered successful [47]. 
Success rates are not much higher in agile projects either: according to a review by VersionOne, only half of agile 
ISD project leaders consider the majority of their projects successful [50]. This relatively low ratio can be a 
consequence of the difficulties related to controlling agile projects. On the one hand, it is a fundamental part of a 
manager’s job to align subordinates’ interests with managerial goals and to continuously motivate team members to 
do their best [5]. Conflicts of interests could arise, for instance, from the amount of efforts employees make to 
participate in agile practices, such as in pair programming and user story creation [29].  
On the other hand, in agile ISD projects responsibilities are set up in a way that protects participants from a 
disproportionate extent of management control [43]. In line with this, Highsmith and Cockburn note that “Agile 
companies practice leadership-collaboration rather than command-control management”, and that “…agility depends 
on trusting the individuals to apply their competency in effective ways” [26]. In addition, a significant part of agile 
literature sees agile as a facilitator of collaboration [59]. Moreover, agile projects are marked by autonomously 
working teams. Autonomy is essential for responding to change in a timely manner, but endless discussions and slow 
decision making may have adverse effects on the development process [18].  
Consequently, it is arguable that control mechanisms in agile ISD projects may target problems and needs that are 
unrelated to aligning interests of project participants to the interests of the organization. To date, empirical research 
on why control activities take place in agile ISD projects is scarce. A literature review conducted by [54] brought into 
light that control is almost exclusively defined from an agency perspective. Besides, secondary case analyses by [41] 
and [54] identified two reasons for control practices in ISD projects: (1) for aligning the interests of participants with 
the interests of the organization and (2) for creating value through communication and coordination. Focusing on value 
creation rather than aligning interests certainly fits the agile philosophy better [59], but the examined ISD projects 
used various methods; hence the validity of findings related to agile ISD projects remained unclear. In addition, the 
secondary data these studies used made it difficult to clearly differentiate between the reasons for control activities 
[41]. It also remained obscure whether managers have further reasons to enact control mechanisms.  
Practically, the study aims to explore the different problems and needs that can be addressed in agile ISD projects 
through control activities and draw controllers’ attention to these. This is important because there can be a 
misalignment between the purpose of control and the way it is enacted in terms of the chosen control modes and 
control styles. For example, it seems counterproductive to employ formal controls in a highly authoritative style when 
the purpose is to enhance communication and cooperation between parties, because such controls can be “costly”: they 
cause negative socioemotional effects, such as stress and burnout [8]. To investigate the matter, an interpretive case 
study [36] has been carried out in a Danish container shipping company, in which a number of agile ISD project 
participants have been examined. From a theoretical perspective, this paper investigates whether the validity of existing 
theories on control purposes (see in e.g. [41]) also holds in agile settings, and seeks to explore potentially applicable 
further theories. Therefore, this research poses the following research questions: Why do managers perform control in 
a large, international organization applying agile as a standard in ISD projects (i), Which theoretical explanations relate 
best to these reasons? (ii) In the following, first the ISD project control literature is reviewed. Then, the research 
methods and the environment where the study took place are described. Next, the findings are presented, and the 
contributions of this work are discussed. Finally the limitations and concluding thoughts are introduced. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1. ISD project control characteristics 
Broadly speaking, control is an effort to influence the behavior of others to achieve goals [48]. Accordingly, one 
can define ISD project control as “an attempt to intentionally affect the behavior of another person or group as a means 
to achieve goals related to designing, developing, operating, using, and managing information systems.” [8][9][10]. 
There are three main features of control: first, it is manager centric, studies on bottom-up and peer to peer control are 
rare. Second, it is goal-oriented, it is enacted with specific aims. Third, it covers a broad variety of practices, called 
control mechanisms, that can be categorized in different ways [31]. Examples of these practices and their 
classifications are present in a number of articles, for instance in [39], [45] and in [46]. In IS context, control focuses 
both on the relationships among organizational actors and on technologies, e.g. software applications, in which it is 
embedded [38].  
Most ISD projects consist of multiple hierarchical layers [52], and control is typically regarded as a dyadic 
relationship between a controller and a controlee. Controllers are those who implement control and are mostly 
managers, for instance, IT project managers. Controlees are their subordinates, usually programmers, analysts and 
testers. Controllers can choose from a wide variety of control mechanisms. These are specific actions, and they define 
who will do what and when [53]. Control mechanisms can be categorized into different control modes. Control modes 
can be further classified as formal and informal. Formal control modes are input, behavior and outcome controls, and 
they clearly describe expectations from controllers. Informal control modes are clan and self-control, and they operate 
by creating shared values and norms [25] [40] [52]. 
A growing body of literature deals with control in agile settings, e.g. [16–18, 33]. Several distinct methodologies 
exist within the agile world, such as extreme programming and Scrum, but they share many common features. These 
include a smaller emphasis on documentation, iterative development, close and informal collaboration and preference 
for self-organization and reflection [17]. From a control perspective, an important trait is the empowerment of project 
teams that have the freedom to make decisions and, thus, project managers take a supportive role rather than a directive 
one [54]. Specialties of Scrum include daily Scrum meetings, where team members give short status updates, user 
stories that provide a general picture of the required features of the software, and backlog creation for listing pending 
requirements. The Scrum method also defines roles, such as the product owner, who acts as the voice of the business 
department, and the Scrum master, who makes sure that agile practices and values are kept [12]. Agile projects tend 
to rely on informal control, as this provides higher autonomy to the team than formal control. Two frequently used 
control modes in agile projects are clan control, embodied in agile ceremonies, and self-control, to provide freedom 
to team members to reach objectives their own way [18]. 
2.2. Reasons to control: agency theory and stewardship theory 
In and outside the domain of IS, control is most often defined and seen through the agency lens [3], [54]. To clarify, 
I do not claim that IS project control literature did not emancipate itself from agency theory at all. For example, the 
concept of self-control, that assumes that controlees can control themselves, has been presented by [27], and it is an 
important aspect of control research to date. Nevertheless, due to agency theory’s prevalence in control literature, it is 
necessary to summarize its key concepts. As per this theory, one party, called the principal, employs another party, 
called the agent, due to the principal’s belief that this relationship derives higher value creation than working alone. 
Both parties are considered self-interested utility maximizers [56]. The agency problem is the result of two things: the 
interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned and that information asymmetry exists between parties. Interests 
are different in two ways: first, principals want agents to maximize their efforts, but agents prefer the opposite. Second, 
principals would like agents to bear the risks of their work, but agents would prefer principals to assume all risks. 
These issues constitute the agency problem that principals want to reduce in a cost efficient way [2]. In agreement 
with agency theory, it has been concluded that one intention behind control is to focus on the problem of value- 
appropriation of controlees [14, 24, 41, 54]. 
However, looking at control only through an agency lens may blind researchers to see differences among the 
motivations of actors and among the different contexts in which control activities take place. [13]. [14, 41, 54] noted 
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that even if the interests of parties are aligned, there is a need to coordinate and communicate work due to task 
dependencies, and assumed that this need can be satisfied through control mechanisms. Relatedly, [41] created the 
concept of “control purpose” that is defined as “the intentions that underline the controller’s choice and 
implementation of specific controls.” There are advocates, for instance [54], who prefer complementing agency theory 
with stewardship theory. This theory has more generous assumptions about human motivations, and it does not 
consider any of the parties self-interested, rather collective serving, trustworthy, hardworking, intrinsically motivated 
and self-actualizing human beings. Consequently, the alignment of interests and monitoring agents are seen as 
unnecessary efforts, despite information asymmetry that this theory also assumes, but which is regarded as a potential 
for learning. In accordance with stewardship theory, it has been presumed that value creation, for instance through 
communication and coordination, may also be an intention behind control activities [14, 24, 41, 54]. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Description of the study environment 
This research has been conducted between October 2018 and May 2019 in a Danish container shipping company 
operating in the transportation and logistics industries. This enterprise offers shipping services, freight forwarding and 
end-to-end supply chain solutions. To increase customer intimacy and to save costs, the firm provides digital solutions 
to its customers, including a purchase experience similar to buying a plane ticket. Clients can instantly book, manage 
and track shipments, submit cargo information and pay online. For this, the company operates a customer facing 
website and numerous mobile applications. In addition to front end systems, the enterprise develops and maintains a 
variety of back-end systems too. A few years ago the department decided to convert itself into an agile organization; 
the Scrum method has been selected for the various ISD projects. 
As described by the Scrum approach, ISD project teams work in sprints that start with a sprint planning meeting, 
where the project teams agree on the sprint backlog, and make decisions about who will do what in the next sprint. At 
daily Scrum meetings team members discuss how the work went the previous day and what their plans are for that 
day. At the end of sprints project teams hold demonstrations to business stakeholders about the new features they 
built. At retrospectives, team members review what went well and what should be improved in the following sprint.  
Following the guidelines of Scrum, Scrum teams consist of programmers, testers, product owners (that are called 
business analysts in the company) and Scrum masters. One or more Scrum teams report to IT project managers. 
Oftentimes some of the roles are outsourced to vendors, and certain roles, such as enterprise architects and solution 
architects, are shared among Scrum teams. 
3.2. Data collection 
This research used an interpretive approach. In line with the interpretive traditions, epistemologically this paper 
holds non-positivism, or that facts and values are intertwined, and both are part of scientific knowledge. Ontologically 
this work draws on internal realism, meaning that reality is an intersubjective construction of shared human apparatus 
[51]. Interpretive case studies are common in IS context (see, for instance, the works of [1, 5] because they are good 
at answering how and why questions [57, 58]. [51] argues that interviews are the primary data sources of interpretive 
researchers, but [28] claims that data should be collected from multiple sources. Therefore, data was gathered not only 
from interviews but from e-mails conversations as well. The unit of analysis of the research was the individual, who 
worked in agile ISD projects situated in the research site. The research site has been chosen because of the usage of 
Scrum in all projects that made the agile ISD projects more homogeneous.  
The interviewing procedure followed the guidelines of intensive interviewing, that is a flexible, open-ended and 
in-depth method that allows researchers to immediately pursue ideas that emerge from interviews [4]. Although 
interviews had a rather loose structure, they used the same interview protocol. Thus, key questions were identical in 
all interviews. Queries were quite general to avoid bias. Initial interview questions focused on collecting 
sociodemographic information and project description. Next, questions were posed to reveal issues related to project 
management, and whether any actions (control mechanisms) were performed as a response. Subsequent questions 
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aimed at uncovering the causes of these actions, and about respondents’ perceptions about the effects of these 
activities. The interviews were finished by asking for potential additional interviewees. 
As shown in Table 1, most interview participants worked as IT project managers, that is a typical controller role 
[53]. The sample also contained business analysts (controlees) because enacting control mechanisms due to agency 
concerns may not be a socially desirable behavior [19]. Consequently, controllers might have avoided talking about 
these concerns. Using business analysts as proxy subjects was one way to avoid this bias [37]. Therefore, controlees 
were asked about the possible causes of control mechanisms enacted by their project managers. The average length of 
the interviews was 55 minutes and were conducted with Skype for Business. All interviews were then transcribed.  
In addition to interviews, e-mails written by the interview participants with controller role have also been collected 
for triangulation purposes. The recipients of these e-mails were their controlees. These e-mails were extracts from the 
so-called Steering Committee meetings, where project managers discussed with senior managers how they saw the 
project proceeding and the deadlines for future project deliverables. The e-mails were written between September 
2017 and June 2018, and gave the opportunity to examine possible changes in the causes of control activities. 
However, the usage of e-mail communication as secondary data source was limited because determining the reasons 
for control activities often involved a great level of subjectivity from the researchers. 
 
Table 1. Sociodemographic details of participants. 
Nr. Gender Nationality Role Work experience 
1. Male Bosnian Project manager 5 years as business analyst and 5 years in the role 
2. Female Croatian Project manager More than 8 years in the role 
3. Male British Business analyst  3 years in the role 
4. Female Danish Project manager 2 years in business analysis, 1 year in the role 
5. Female Danish Business analyst 5 years in the role 
6. Male Portuguese Project manager 2 years in the role 
7. Male Algerian Project manager More than 10 years in the role 
8. Female British Business analyst 3 years in the role 
9. Male Swedish Project manager 7 years in the role 
10. Female British Project manager 5 years in the role 
11. Male Italian Project manager 8 years as business analyst, 2 years in the role 
12. Male Indian Project manager 3 years in the role 
13. Female Brazilian Business analyst 3 years in the role 
14. Male Turkish Business analyst 4 years in the role 
3.3. Data analysis 
The data analysis was conducted in Nvivo12 to where the transcripts and e-mails were uploaded, and it followed 
the “Gioia method” [7, 22, 23]. This method has already been used in IS research, e.g. by [30], and it is particularly 
useful for this research because it helps to understand lived experiences of interviewees [21]. The “Gioia method” has 
also been chosen due to its rigorousness, as it allows researchers to iterate between data and theory, that is consistent 
with the use of theory in interpretive research [51]. Finally, this method has been selected because it offers an elegant 
way of presenting findings [23]. Following the guidelines of the method, the analysis had two steps.  
Step 1. First-order concepts have been formulated, that are representations of how interview participants viewed 
what was happening in the organization and the way they captured their meanings associated to them [32]. For this, 
the in vivo coding technique [42] was applied because at this stage the authors’ own interpretations needed to be 
minimized.  
Step 2. Similarities and differences among first-order concepts have been identified, and based on these they have 
been grouped into second-order themes. This step, that was already situated in the theoretical realm [23], had many 
iterations in which the authors shifted from first-order concepts to literature back and forth, and it also resulted in 
subsequent interviews that focused on the possible relationships among first-order concepts. The second-order themes 
were then further grouped into aggregate dimensions. The names of these dimensions were taken from literature [35, 
41, 44, 54]. Once the first-order concepts, second-order themes and aggregate dimensions were identified, it was 
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possible to prepare the data structure shown in Figure 1. The data structure visually highlights the journey from the 
words of participants to key findings and this is fundamental for the rigorousness of qualitative research [23]. It is 
important to note that the “Gioia method” does not stop at this point, but its aim is to develop theory. However, this 
research stopped at drawing specific implications, and this goal is aligned with the chosen interpretive research 
approach. As a consequence, this paper highlights tendencies, rather than predictions, and it may provide useful 
insights for related research conducted only in similar contexts [51]. 
4. Findings 
In this section, controllers’ reasons to control their agile ISD projects in the technology department of Danish 
container shipping company are described. First, this is done by presenting the data structure (Figure 1), and then 
findings are illustrated with the help of quotations. 
 
Fig. 1. Data structure 
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4.1. Control for value creation  
Every respondent underlined that control activities were conducted because agile ISD projects were complex, and 
this complexity required continuous coordination. Complexity stemmed from a number of reasons. First, project 
participants worked in different geographical locations, and had diverse expertise areas. Second, building an 
information system posed numerous challenges, including changing business processes and technological obstacles. 
Third, the completion of one task of a project member often depended on a task of another project member. Fourth, 
the length and the team size required thorough documentation on who did what and when. Fifth, project participants 
tended to develop own way of thinking about the purposes of their work. Interviewees pointed out that control 
mechanisms, such as physical and virtual team meetings, one-on-ones, requirements and user stories could address 
the above mentioned concerns. They helped to create a common understating of everyday tasks and of the project as 
a whole. They also aided participants to be informed about the ambitions of the project.  
Q1 (IT project manager): Things would fall apart otherwise. Even if we would talk every day, if you don’t ask the 
right question, things can fall apart. People are in different locations, in different environment, and own way of 
thinking can develop. They would not know the purpose of their work. So I have to make sure they know why they are 
working. 
Another reason to enact control mechanisms was that the status of the project was continuously changing, and 
status meetings were seen as forums where the status was communicated. Thus, project participants, including the 
controller, could update their knowledge about the stage of the project. Controllers were also required to give status 
updates to rest of the organization.  
Q2 (Business analyst): We do general project updates. From business side, has anything changed in the priorities? 
Also, updates from test team, and what are the BAs working on? […] Are we all on the same page?  
Controlees were often portrayed as dutiful, honest and ethical and, thus, trust was an emerging theme among many 
interviewees. In addition, controlees were expected to enact self-control. Another interesting finding was that the word 
“control” sounded negative for many controllers, and they associated control with micromanagement, ordering people 
around and criticizing employees. As a consequence, many of them refused to say that they even control their projects.  
Q3 (Project manager): I never had this approach to control…micromanage, if you will… I never wanted to have a 
team where I was instructing people how to work. 
4.2. Control against value appropriation 
The concern for company value appropriation due to self-interested controlees was expressed less often. Four 
common situations have been identified in which the primary reason to control was to cope with agency concerns. 
First, when some controlees were working on multiple projects of the company at the same time. This meant that 
controllers had to confront controlees if they did not prioritize or did not spend sufficient time on their project but on 
other projects instead. Consequently, in such situations controlees were still seen as employees whose interests were 
aligned with the company but not with the project. A somewhat similar situation was when different job roles within 
a project had different key performance indicators. While the overall project success was part of controlees’ yearly 
evaluation, individual contribution was another critical component of their performance assessment. For instance, 
while a product owner was assessed based on the number of user stories prepared, the performance of a project 
manager was determined by how successfully they avoided cost overruns.  
Q4 (IT project manager): Progress would not happen. Because people have different priorities. Look at the solution 
architects, for example. They are not necessarily 100 percent allocated to my project. It could be that it is just one 
percent of their work. So I need a close follow up with them, otherwise there would be someone else asking for delivery 
from them. And they would prioritize that. 
Q5 (IT project manager): Every single person will have different objectives. So these are never fully aligned. So we 
need to build bridges, and meet half way. I want to do things quickly, but the business side, business analysts may 
want different things. 
Second, controllers believed that the interests of some project stakeholders were not aligned with the company’s 
interests. It was the case of outsourced agile ISD projects, controllers expressed that control mechanisms were in place 
against self-serving behavior of vendors. Third, during the hiring process of new project participants, controllers 
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enacted control because at this early stage of the relationship there was a lack of trust from the controllers’ side, and 
they expressed that applicants may mislead them.  
Q6 (IT project manager): We set costs on deliverables. We created the scope for the vendor, and then created a set 
price contract for this vendor. It means if they are quick, they would have lower costs for themselves. They bounded 
themselves to the scope and not to time. So if they deliver slowly, they themselves will spend quite some resources, 
and also we sell the vendors that if they deliver well, there can be more work for them. 
Q7 (IT project manager): Yes, people exaggerate at interviews, everyone. I take interviews and CVs with a grain 
of salt. I have a dialogue with HR, and look at the intelligence and personality scores, at interviews there is little time 
to get to know someone. 
Fourth, certain team members tended to leave the office earlier than they were supposed to. And while flexible 
working hours were allowed for employees, the manager felt that unreported leave is a sign of minimizing efforts. 
Q8 (IT project manager): …They just left, when I came by, I could see 2-3 people are not there, I asked where they 
are… then next morning they said we just left to go home. 
4.3. Signalling and isomorphism 
The interviews and e-mails revealed two more reasons to enact control mechanisms. A common characteristic 
among these was that they could not be fully explained with either stewardship or agency theories. First, many 
controllers asserted that a reason to enact certain control mechanisms was that it was expected from them by their 
superiors. They believed that it was part of their responsibilities, and that more control was seen as better performance 
by senior management because the more information they had, the more credible they looked. Therefore, they used 
control as a signal that the project was in good hands. But signalling was also the reason to have one-on-one meetings 
between controlees and the controller. It was because controllers believed that these talks provided opportunities for 
controlees to highlight what they achieved. Reporting about these great achievements to senior management was 
favorable because it provided visibility for the project, controlees might have got wider recognition, and controllers 
also believed that this might have triggered even better performance from them in the future.  
Q9 (IT project manager): There are expectations towards my boss, so I need to make sure we follow some processes, 
even if I don’t really like them. But it is part of work… it needs to be done. 
Q10 (IT project manager): When people get recognized how well they did, they will do even better. And it’s not just 
about me. It is also important for people outside [company name] and in senior positions to see what we did. So I 
encourage my team to do demonstrations to leaders. It is a way for them to showcase their work.  
In a similar fashion, improving leadership skills was also mentioned as reason to conduct control activities. It was 
because controllers saw themselves as better leaders if they developed talents. Moreover, as another instance of 
signalling, controllers believed that their superiors would have also evaluated them better, if they had developed talent.  
Q11 (Business analyst): He also has people reporting to him, so he develops himself as a leader, by wanting to 
develop talent. He wants to see people improve. He is good at promoting his people, and developing them. But it also 
makes him look better, right? 
Second, the agile framework and the different agile ceremonies were control mechanisms that were enacted because 
controllers believed that this was the best method to be followed for ISD projects. This was because managers thought 
that it is a proven method and it has been used already in a broad variety of companies. Hence, controllers assumed 
that using agile and the control mechanisms it brings provided more legitimacy to the project and also that they would 
look more professional. It was also interesting that some project managers claimed that they used agile because it was 
mandated by senior management. However, other sources reported that IT project managers had the freedom to choose 
their development methods. Therefore, because of normative forces to look professional and because of the coercive 
forces have been coming from senior management, IT projects became isomorphic, and all of them used the Scrum 
method and associated control mechanisms.  
Q12 (IT project manager): I am convinced that it [agile] is a good framework, evidence in the industry is present. 
We decided to use it as a team, that’s why I am using it. 
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5. Discussion 
The research questions of this study were the followings: Why do managers perform control in a large, international 
organization applying agile as a standard in ISD projects (i) and Which theoretical explanations relate best to these 
reasons (ii)? Concerning the first research question, managers performed control activities primarily because of two 
reasons: to help value creation through facilitating communication and cooperation in the Scrum teams, and to 
minimize their agency concerns related to team members. However, two additional reasons appeared. First, the 
evidence of signalling became apparent, for instance control was a signal to senior management with the intention that 
the signalers, IT project managers would look better in the eyes senior managers. Second, controllers enacted the 
control mechanisms of Scrum because Scrum (and agile in general) has been seen an industry standard, and controllers 
wanted to follow professional norms. This also made projects look similar to each other (isomorphism).  
Concerning the second research question, the study found that agency theory, related to value appropriation, can 
explain control mechanisms. It has also been discovered that self-interest, a central concept in agency theory, has two 
distinct variations in an organization where multiple agile ISD projects are running in parallel. A common view among 
controllers was that while controlees may not work for the best interest of a certain project, their self-interest is aligned 
with the broader interests of the organization. This could happen either because they worked on multiple projects at 
the same time and prioritized other projects or because they focused on their own performance based on their 
individual KPIs. Therefore, controlees were not depicted in a “classical” self-interested way as it is described by 
agency theory literature, for instance in the studies of [2] and [56]. This finding highlights that the different controls 
in the organization can be in conflict with each other, as it was also pointed out by [55]. In other situations (e.g. 
unreported leave from the office), however, controllers deemed that the controlees’ self-interests did not serve either 
the project or the organization. Both views on self-interest triggered control mechanisms. Control literature mostly 
relies on agency theory to interpret control activities [11, 49], and this theory also has explanatory power in agile 
settings.  
This study also showed that a reason to enact control mechanisms may not be to minimize the agency problem, but 
to create value through coordination and communication, as suggested by [41] and [54.]. Stewardship theory has the 
capacity to explain this finding. In fact, stewardship theory fits very well with the ethos of agile software development. 
For example, stewardship theory emphasizes mutual trust, aligned goals and intrinsic motivation as well as 
empowering structures and collectivistic behavior [13]. The attitudes of interview participants, were largely aligned 
with these beliefs. There is only one idea of stewardship theory that is not in line with the agile thinking, and this is 
individualism. Agile developers tend to be individualistic, especially millennials are likely do things their own way 
[20], while stewardship theory assumes stewards to be collectivistic. The data suggests that in the case organization 
controllers believed that while controlees might have one things the way they wanted, this way also served the 
collective purposes of the team. 
While prior research on control purposes [14, 24, 41, 54] only considered agency and stewardship theories to 
explain the reasons for control activities, this study explored that also signalling and institutional theory may help to 
reveal why controllers enact control mechanisms. With regards to signalling theory, the analysis found that controllers 
looked at control activities as deliverables to senior management. Moreover, managers wanted to develop talent, so 
that they seemed better leaders by senior managers. On the one hand these imply that the dyadic controller – controlee 
approach to conceptualize control might be too narrow as suggested by [52], on the other hand, this is in line with the 
assumptions of signalling theory [6]. According to this theory, signallers try to reduce information asymmetry that 
occurs between the signaller (IT project manager) and the receiver (senior management) with the help of signals to 
develop trust from senior managers. It seems control and control effects can be used as signals to senior management, 
signalling that the project is doing well, and that it is led by a high performing project manager. Future research could 
examine whether signalling is a conceptually distinct reason for control activities from value appropriation because 
signalling theory shares a number of common assumptions with agency theory, such as information asymmetry and 
potential for conflict of interests.  
Concerning institutional theory, results imply that controllers’ autonomy to enact control mechanisms may be 
limited by regulations of, for example, senior management, and that controllers are also heavily influenced by 
professional norms, such as popular software development methodologies. Isomorphism, a key concept of institutional 
theory [15] may explain this finding. Presumably, if controllers feel external pressure to enact control mechanisms 
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then they prefer complying with these expectations, even if they had better ideas about how the project should be 
managed. This is what the theory calls coercive isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism in this context took place in 
order to make managers conform to the industry wide community of IT professionals. 
In addition, even if senior management had given the freedom to IT project managers to choose control mechanisms 
autonomously, they might have been part of professional associations, and they might have received similar trainings 
as others in the broader IT project managers’ community. These communities create norms that community members 
may wish to follow. Thus, similar ideas among the members of the community may diffuse. Institutional theory calls 
this concept normative isomorphism [34]. 
6. Limitations and conclusion 
Beyond the general limitations related to qualitative research, there are two main drawbacks pertinent to this study. 
First, it was assumed that a certain control activity is enacted due to one specific reason. However, it may concurrently 
serve multiple purposes as mentioned by [54]. For example, the finding that control was seen as a method to improve 
leadership skills can also be subsumed under the value creation category and not only as an evidence of signalling. It 
is because it can be considered as a way of self-enhancement that also creates value for the organization. As a second 
limitation of this study, data was gathered only from one, or in some cases, two participants of each Scrum team. 
Therefore, the data are insufficient to be used for interpretations at project level. Future studies may wish to collect 
data from each member of agile projects that would make it appropriate to raise the level of analysis to project level.  
To conclude, this study highlighted that there are multiple reasons in agile ISD projects to enact control 
mechanisms, and while it is stewardship theory that fits the agile philosophy most, agency, signalling and institutional 
theories can explain phenomena that remains unexplained by stewardship theory. The author encourages other 
researchers to extend or quantitatively test the findings, possibly by including new theoretical lenses introduced in this 
study. 
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